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Underwriting Crowdfunding
Darian M. Ibrahim*
Abstract
Crowdfunding has more in common with an initial public offering (IPO) than may be readily
apparent. Both are coordinated sales of securities to public investors (in crowdfunding's case,
the "crowd"). Both rely on disclosure to mitigate information asymmetries between a company
and its investors. Yet IPOs protect investors better for two reasons. First, companies
undertaking an IPO have significant track records to disclose, unlike nascent startups. Second,
IPOs are underwritten, meaning a reputational intermediary vouches for them.
This Essay considers applying underwriting to Regulation Crowdfunding (Regulation CF) to
allow crowdfunding to mimic an IPO. It tackles questions such as: Who would be the
underwriter? What potential legal liability would crowdfunding underwriters face? And what
changes to Regulation CF are necessary to permit underwritten crowdfunding offerings?
* Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School; Fellow, Center for the Study of Law and
Markets, William & Mary Law School. I would like to thank: William & Mary Law School
and the Center for the Study of Law and Markets for financial support; John Coyle and
Joe Green for insightful comments; William & Mary law students Taylor Allison, Mere-
dith Buerger, and Brooke Lowell; and William & Mary law librarian Fred Dingledy for
excellent research and editing assistance.
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I. Introduction
Crowdfunding in many ways resembles an initial public offering (IPO). Both are
coordinated sales of securities by a company, both for the first time,' and both to the
public at large. But crowdfunding is much less regulated than an IPO.
2 So long as a
startup lists its offering on a "funding portal"-which is a website not even required
to register as a broker-dealer'-then anyone with an Internet connection and a few
dollars can buy in.4 Unlike companies undertaking an IPO, crowdfunding startups are
largely unknown entities with minimal track records or operating history,' exacerbat-
ing the risk of loss for investors.
Crowdfunding was legalized by the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act
of 2012,6 with the final rules set forth in 2015's Regulation Crowdfunding (Regulation
CF).! Since 2015, startups in the food, beverage, lifestyle, and tech fields have been
selling securities to unaccredited, unsophisticated investors under the protections of
Regulation CF.' In its June 2019 report on crowdfunding's first three years, the SEC
estimated there were 1,351 offerings under Regulation CF, 539 of which reached their
1. Obviously, a company undertaking an IPO will have sold securities, likely in a coordi-
nated fashion, in private placements prior to an IPO. But an IPO is the first coordinated
sale to the public at large.
2. Equity crowdfunding, the focus of this Essay, involves selling securities to investors, and
thus is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). See Darian M. Ibra-
him, Equity Crowdfunding: A Market for Lemons?, 100 MINN. L. REv. 561, 568 (2015) (distin-
guishing equity crowdfunding from rewards-based or donative crowdfunding, which do
not involve selling securities and there is far less regulation).
3. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.300(a) (2016) (defining intermediaries that may sell under Regulation
Crowdfunding as registered brokers, funding portals, or registered national securities as-
sociation members).
4. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 571 (detailing the difference between
"true equity crowdfunding" which allows unaccredited investors to participate as com-
pared to "most Rule 506 offerings, and virtually all startups' sales to angels and VCs, are
limited to accredited investors"); see also 17 C.F.R. §227.100(a)(2) (detailing investment
limits for accredited compared to unaccredited investors).
5. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM., REPORT TO THE COMMISSION: REGULATION
CROWDFUNDING 5 (June 18, 2019), https: / / www.sec.gov / files / regulation-crowdfunding-
2019 0.pdf (hereinafter SEC REPORT) (over the first three years of Regulation CF, "the me-
dian offering was by an issuer that was incorporated approximately two years prior to
the offering and employed about three people."); see also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Gate-
keepers of Crowdfunding, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 885, 901 (2018) ("Public companies, such
as those that trade on the New York Stock Exchange, as well as foreign companies, are ...
excluded" from using Regulation CF).
6. Jumpstart our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
7. 82 Fed. Reg. 17552 (Apr. 12, 2017).
8. Marc A. Leaf, Robert T. Esposito & Abigail Luhn, Leading the Crowd: An Analysis of the
First 50 Crowdfunding Offerings, DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP (July 14, 2016),
https: / / www.drinkerbiddle.com /insights / publications / 2016 / 07 / leading-the-crowd-
first-50-crowdfunding-offerings (stating that "[als of June 30, 2016, 50 companies have
filed a Form C with the SEC to offer securities under the Regulation Crowdfunding ex-
emption").
291Spring 2020
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
target goal in the offering.' The average crowdfunding offering sought the target
amount of $52,428.10
The SEC's June 2019 report on crowdfunding's initial results is generally posi-
tive." Despite the small individual offerings, in the aggregate, crowdfunding efforts
raised almost $1 billion in 2017.12 Still, the SEC warns that its report examines a rela-
tively short time frame under "favorable economic conditions."" And most im-
portantly, it is unclear what is happening now with those successful offerings. Did
they go on to raise additional funding? Did anyone provide the entrepreneur with the
value-added services that are as important than capital for growing a new business?14
Despite some academic skepticism," I have argued that crowdfunding can work.6
And the initial results are bearing that prediction out. But major structural problems
still remain. Information asymmetry, agency costs, and adverse selection problems
are rife in this environment, and all must be sufficiently mitigated for crowdfunding
to succeed." This Essay argues that, due to the similarities between crowdfunding and
IPOs, the SEC should also consider allowing in crowdfunding what has worked well
in firm-commitment IPOs: underwriting. Crowdfunding may not yet offer enough eco-
nomic incentive for underwriters, but if that can be changed, the effective signaling
9. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 4; see also JD Alois, Three Years of Reg CF: 44 Funding Portals,
9 Departures, 1 Suspension & $200 Million Raised, CROWDFUND INSIDER (May 21, 2019, 11:21
AM), https:/ / www.crowdfundinsider.com/ 2019/05/147569-three-years-of-reg-cf-44-
funding-portals-9-departures-1-suspension-200-million-raised / (listing numerous fund-
ing portals).
10. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
11. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-5 (discussing initial results); but see Joyce M. Rosenberg,
Begun with big hopes, crowdfund investing proves no bonanza, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 9,
2018), https:/ /www.apnews.com/eda654006c834db58e2d483a70abb819 (discussing
crowdfunding's slow start).
12. ScoTT KuPOR, SECRETS OF SAND HILL ROAD: VENTURE CAPITAL AND How To GET IT 273
(2019) ("[In 2017, roughly $1 billion was raised through crowdfunding efforts in the US,
an increase of about 25 percent from the previous year.").
13. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
14. See infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text on the importance of value-added services
to entrepreneurial businesses as they grow.
15. Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding, 39 J. CoRP. L. 493, 496 (2014) (sug-
gesting that opportunities will be "terrible"); Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraud-
funding-Social Networks and the Securities Laws -Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must
Be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REv. 1735, 1767 (2012) ("Exposing un-
sophisticated investors to risky investments without adequate disclosure unduly sacri-
fices investor-protection goals to the perceived need to lower the disclosure barriers for
small businesses and crowdfunding techniques."); Cf., Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle,
Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe SAFE, 102 VA. L. REv. ONLINE 168 (2016) (arguing that
so-called SAFE securities are inappropriate for investors in crowdfunding offerings).
16. Ibrahim, Equity Crozvdfunding, supra note 2, at 589-91 (arguing that crowdfunding appeals
to self-sufficient managers of a new business); Darian M. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without
the Crowd, 95 N.C.L. REv. 1481, 1499 (2017) (applauding the expanding screening role for
funding portals under regulation CF).
17. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Expe-
rience, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1067, 1077 (discussing the trio of problems that must be overcome
in startup investing; uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency costs).
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they provide is the best way to help crowdfunding take its place as a sound waystation
in entrepreneurial finance.
In IPOs, underwriters such as Goldman Sachs perform valuable diligence on com-
panies going public, counsel them on capital structure and legal matters, and "rent"
their reputations to the companies-essentially vouching for them to public investors
who are at an informational disadvantage about the quality of these companies."
Thus, underwriters are reputational intermediaries who have a financial and reputa-
tional interest in selecting high-quality offerings to underwrite.1
9 Importantly, in a
firm-commitment offering, underwriters actually buy all of the shares a company is
offering to the public, then turn around and immediately resell them.
20 This minimizes
risk for the issuer (all of its offered shares are sold to the underwriter) and incentivizes
the underwriter to carefully select the securities it will underwrite.
2
1 In essence, firm-
commitment IPOs provide a valuable selection and risk-minimizing function for pub-
lic investors.
With some changes to Regulation CF, crowdfunding offerings could employ the
"firm commitment" underwriting mechanism that makes traditional IPOs successful.
Crowdfunding offerings, like IPOs, could use underwriters to serve as reputational
intermediaries between startups and investors. Many thorny issues would have to be
resolved for underwriting crowdfunding to become a reality, most notably: 1) who
would have sufficient incentive to serve as underwriter; and 2) what would an under-
writer's legal liability be for serving as underwriter?
22
Previewing the first question, there are several candidates for underwriter, but a
funding portal or angel investor is the most likely candidate.2
3 A funding portal or
angel investor may underwrite a crowdfunding offering for several reasons: first, to
be sure the target fundraising goal is met; second, to signal support for the startup to
18. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REv. 549, 620 (1984) (discussing the value added by having an investment banker in-
volved in the process); see Bengi Ertuna, et al., The Effect of the Issuer-Underwriter Relation-
ship on IPOs: The Case of an Emerging Market, 8 J. ENTREPRENEURIAL FIN. 43, 45 (2003); Ber-
nard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 781, 788 (2001) ("reputational intermediaries ... vouch for disclosure
quality and thereby reduce information asymmetry in securities markets.").
19. Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of "Technological Disinter-
mediation" for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 1, 14 (1998)
("Financial intermediaries .. .have reputations to protect as repeat players in the capital
marketplace.").
20. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 491 (5th
ed. 2019) (underwriters ". . . purchase the entire offering from the issuer before turning
around and reselling the securities to investors.").
21. Id.
22. The second question is related to the first: a party is less likely to have economic incentive
to serve as underwriter if a high probability of potential legal liability factors into the
calculation.
23. See infra Part IV.B. A funding portal is the website that hosts crowdfunding offerings.
Stuart R. Kohn, The New Crowdfunding Registration Exemption: Good Idea, Bad Execution, 64
FLA. L. REv. 1433, 1439 (2012). An angel investor is a wealthy individual, usually an ex-
entrepreneur, who invests personal funds in startups. 1brahim, Crowdfunding Without the
Crowd, supra note 16, at 1494.
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follow-on investors; and third, to force the startup into professionalizing disclosures
by complying with Regulation CF's requirements. In answer to the second question,
a funding portal or angel may face liability for a startup's fraud should they serve as
underwriter, substantially changing the risk/reward calculus in underwriting a
crowdfunding offering.
Despite these issues, the underwriting thought experiment is worth considering.
Without underwriters, crowdfunding offerings are akin to direct public offerings
(DPOs), or sales securities into the public markets directly to the ultimate investors.
DPOs are more suited for well-known companies like Snap than for brand-new
startups that need reputational capital to signal quality to potential investors.24
This Essay explores what changes would be necessary to current law to allow un-
derwritten crowdfunding offerings. In particular, Regulation CF would need the fol-
lowing amendments: 1) the crowdfunding exemption itself should be open to under-
writers also instead of just issuers (i.e., underwriters should be permitted to avail
themselves of the Regulation CF offering exemption and immediately resell securities
to the crowd as if they were the issuer);2 5 2) in larger crowdfunding offerings, the
$107,000 investment limit for any one investor should be removed for underwriters (as
the underwriter would need to purchase an entire crowdfunding offering to mimic a
firm-commitment IPO);26 and 3) the current one-year required holding period should
be eliminated for underwriters, permitting them to immediately resell crowdfunding
securities.27  1
II. How Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) Work
An initial public offering, or IPO, is when a privately-held company makes a co-
ordinated sale of its securities to the public for the first time.28 The process is expensive
and time-intensive.29 And it is highly regulated by the SEC, both in terms of the timing
and content of disclosures. There are different types of IPOs, the major ones being the
firm-commitment IPO and the DPO previewed in the Introduction, as well as the best-
24. See, e.g., Kyla Houge, Reverse Mergers: A Legitimate Method for Companies to Go Public or an
Easy Way to Commit Fraud?, 36 J. NAT'L AsS'N JUD. 325, 338 (2016) ("[A] direct public offer-
ing can also benefit larger corporations who wish to 'leverage their name recognition on
a global basis."'); see also Anita Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 433, 449 (2003) (suggesting "investors [are] more inclined to invest in
DPOs" of "seasoned issuers").
25. See infra Part V.A.
26. See infra Part V.B.
27. See infra Part V.C.
28. Gladriel Shobe, Private Benefits in Public Offerings: Tax Receivable Agreements in IPOs, 71
VAND. L. REv. 889, 890 (2018) ("[P]re-IPO owners sold shares of a company to the public,
turning a privately held company into a publicly held company ... [and] the interests
that the pre-IPO owners sold to the public represented shares in the whole publicly traded
company.").
29. See Barry McCarthy, IPOs Are Too Expensive and Cumbersome, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2018),
https:/ / www.ft.com /content/ 60cdlbb8-9970-11e8-88de-49c908b1f264.
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efforts and Dutch auction IPOs." Each IPO method differs in its specifics, and conse-
quently, in the signal it sends public investors about the quality of the offering.
A. The Firm-Commitment IPO
The firm-commitment IPO is the most common and most favored type of IPO by
issuers, underwriters, and the public.3 1 In a firm commitment, the company going
public (the "issuer") hires an investment bank as underwriter. Multiple investment
banks serve as underwriters, but the process is managed by a lead underwriter.
32 The
lead underwriter (hereinafter referred to as just "the underwriter" for simplicity) coun-
sels the company on its capital structure, number of shares to sell to the public, the
offering price, and various other matters.33 The underwriter also uses its connections
to find investors for the offering."
The unique and defining feature of a firm-commitment IPO is that the underwriter
actually purchases all the shares the company is offering.35 The underwriter then turns
around and resells the shares to other investors.3 6 Using a real estate analogy, a firm-
commitment offering would involve the realtor buying the seller's house outright,
then reselling it to the eventual buyer.3 ' The realtor must price the initial sale correctly
in order to make a profit on the resale. And the realtor must be confident that she can
resell the house before purchasing it.
30. See also Christine Hurt, What Google Can't Tell Us About Internet Auctions (And What It Can),
37 U. TOL. L. REv. 403, 413 (2006) (discussing "an online IPO auction process called
OpenlPO').
31. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 22 (7thed. 2017) (The "most com-
mon" type of underwriting "in the country is firm-commitment underwriting.").
32. See Jeremy McClane, The Agency Costs of Teamwork, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 1229, 1240-42
(2016) (describing the role of underwriters, including the lead underwriter); William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 1143, 1146
(2013) ("Public offerings are typically marketed and sold to the public by a syndicate of
underwriters.").
33. See McClane, supra note 32, at 1241-44.
34. Mark Koba, Initial Public Offering: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:54 AM),
https:/ /www.cnbc.com/id/47099278. See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial
Public Offering, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 711, 725 (2005) ("Critical to the underwriter's incentive
to underprice is the fact that the underwriter has the power to determine which institu-
tions and individuals will be able to share in this wealth extraction.").
35. See Cody L. Lipke, Direct Listing: How Spotify is Streaming on the NYSE and Why the SEC
Should Press Play, 12 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 149, 153 (2019) ("[Tlhe underwriter
takes on the risk by purchasing the security at a fixed price and then sells the security lo
the public at a higher offering price.").
36. Royce de R. Barondes, NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest-Does Gatekeeping
Work?, 79 TUL. L. REv. 859, 868 (2005) ("In a typical IPO, a syndicate (group) of investment
banks formally purchases securities from an issuer and immediately resells them to the
public."); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard, supra note 34, at 723-25 ("In an IPO, the issuing
company sells its shares at the offering price. If the offering price increases in the first day,
even dramatically, the issuer does not profit from any share price increase. The re-
sellers .. . capture this price increase.").
37. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 643 n.247.
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The firm-commitment method is not without critics for its clubbiness. Issuers
leave money on the table by underpricing the sales to underwriters." The underwriter
then turns around and sells the shares to its favored institutional investors, who are
usually its client base for other investment banking services the underwriter pro-
vides.39 Those favored investors then sell to the public, who end up paying a premium
for the shares.40 Still, the firm-commitment IPO is the gold standard because the un-
derwriter, not the issuer, carries the risk "if the offering is undersubscribed."4 1 Invest-
ment banks play the role of reputational intermediary between issuers and investors
in all IPOs, and in particular in firm-commitment IPOs.42 In this role, investment banks
act "as reputational agents for the issuer, attesting to the investment worthiness of an
38. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 613, 660 (1988) ("Underwriters thus can
be expected to err on the side of underpricing, which helps ensure that all the shares sell
quickly and they receive the spread on the entire issue."); id. at 664 ("Underwriter mis-
pricing of new issues means that corporations going public may face wildly differing
costs of equity capital; some firms sell stock at steep discounts while others raise funds at
bargain basement rates."); Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic
Analysis of the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOKLYN L. REv.
583, 590-99 (2004) (discussing various theories as to why underwriters underprice, such
as "spinning", in which the underwriter offers underpriced IPO shares to important cus-
tomers to raise future goodwill); Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO
Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 310 (2002) (theorizing that underpricing insures issuers
and underwriters against future legal liability); Tom C. W. Lin, Infinite Financial Interme-
diation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 649 (2015); Barondes, supra note 36, at 868 ("The in-
vestment banks' profits come from the 'spread,' the difference between their purchase
prices and the prices at which they offer the securities to the market.").
39. See McClane, supra note 32, at 1242 ("The investors to whom the IPO is marketed are typ-
ically large institutional investors."); Hurt, supra note 30, at 404, 405 ("The recipients of
those [IPO] shares are usually institutional investors known to the underwriters and reg-
ular customers of the underwriters."); Barondes, supra note 36, at 870 ("If the investment
bank facilitates profitable transactions for investor-customers, the investment bank may
get other future business at market prices.").
40. Barondes, supra note 36, at 867 ("Historically, stock sold in an IPO on average has traded
immediately following the IPO, e.g., by the close of business on the first trading day, at a
significant premium."); Andres Rueda, The Hot IPO Phenomenon and the Great Internet
Bust, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 21, 51 (2001) ("Any investor lucky enough to be allo-
cated shares of a hot IPO is virtually guaranteed a risk-free profit by 'flipping' it in the
aftermarket.").
41. Jay B. Kesten & Murat C. Mungan, Political Uncertainty and the Market for IPOs, 41 J. CORP.
L. 431, 439 (2015) (articulating that the underwriter bears the risk in a firm-backed IPO
and therefore if the underwriter thinks the price is too high the underwriter will
acknowledge that risk). As a practical matter, the underwriter's risk is minimal, as the
underwriter does not sign the underwriting agreement until it has secured commitments
from subsequent purchasers. See, e.g., 74 Fed. Reg. 68101, 68117 (Dec. 22, 2009) (Goldman
Sachs asserting in a filing with Dept. of Labor that they do not execute an underwriting
agreement until they have received sufficient indication of interest).
42. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REv. 279,
283 (2000) ("[A]n investor who lacks information on individual issuers might have good
information on intermediaries, such as broker-dealers, mutual funds, or exchanges. Such
investors will select intermediaries that offer desired investors protections.").
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offering to the public."43 Thus, firm commitments benefit the public as well as the
issuer, underwriter, and favored institutional investors." Due to these advantages,
90% of all public offerings are firm commitments.4 5
B. The Best-Efforts IPO
The less common form of IPO is the best efforts. In the best-efforts IPO, the un-
derwriter does not actually purchase all the shares in the offering. Instead, the issuer
retains ownership of these shares and sells directly to institutional and retail inves-
tors.46 An underwriter is still involved in structuring the offering, selling efforts, etc.:
for lending its reputational capital and expertise to the issuer, the underwriter receives
a commission on sales.47 Returning to our real estate analogy, this is the equivalent of
a brokered-home sale, with the realtor taking a cut of the purchase price from the seller.
Because the underwriter does not purchase the shares outright, however, the reputa-
tional signal it sends the issuer is less than in a firm commitment." The underwriter
is not fully standing behind the company's prospects, since the gold standard is a firm-
commitment offering, thus the credibility signal it sends the public about the com-
pany's prospects is weaker.49
Direct public offerings and Dutch auction IPOs also exist, but are better seen as
offshoots of the firm-commitment or best-efforts IPOs than separate offering types.
DPOs and Dutch auctions have even less need for underwriters. A DPO is just as it
sounds: the issuer sells directly to the public. Employing our real estate analogy once
more, the DPO is the "for sale by owner" option of home selling. A Dutch auction is
43. Lin, supra note 38, at 649. See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 620 ("In essence,
the investment banker rents the issuer its reputation."); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Or-
dering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 14 (2002) ("The
reliability of ratings can be explained by reputation costs: the profitability of rating agen-
cies is directly dependent on their reputations. Inaccurate ratings will impair, if not de-
stroy, a rating agency's reputation.").
44. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 18, at 620 (articulating how the underwriter bears the
loss or risk associated with the IPO).
45. Kesten & Mungan, supra note 41, at 439.
46. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 73 (a best-efforts underwriting "does not put the underwriter at
risk in the event that investors do not purchase the entire allotment being offered to the
public.") See also Rueda, supra note 40, at 32.
47. HAZEN, supra note 31, at 73 ("Best efforts underwriting is generally used by less estab-
lished issuers that cannot find an investment banker who is willing to make a firm com-
mitment because of the speculative nature of the distribution."). See also Jennifer O'Hare,
Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 217, 218 n.5 (1996) ("[Iln a best efforts underwriting,
the traditional underwriter does not assume the risk of placing the securities. Rather than
purchasing the securities from the issuer, the traditional underwriter merely promises to
use its "best efforts" in finding purchasers.").
48. Arthur McMahon, It Takes a Village to Fund a Start-Up: How an Electronic Community for
Early-Stage Investments Can Bring Democracy Back to Equity Crowdfunding, 84U. CIN. L. REV.
1269, 1308 (2016) (best-efforts "typically signals a lower quality offering").
49. O'Hare, supra note 47, at 247 ("Traditional underwriters conducting best efforts offerings
do not undertake firm commitment risk.").
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similar, but the offering price is set by the public, not by the issuer." A Dutch auction
is a "strategic game" where bidders have to take into account probable bids that others
might make." The price rises at the auction until one bidder remains, each bidding the
highest they are willing to pay.5 2 Therefore, the market clearing price is determined by
the investors.5 3 In sharp contrast to the firm-commitment underwriting, the DPO and
Dutch auction minimize the role of underwriters.5 As such, the role of underwriters
as reputational intermediaries between issuers and the public is dramatically reduced.
Due to the firm commitment's advantages, this Essay only considers importing the
firm commitment mechanism to the crowdfunding context.
III. Why Crowdfunding Resembles an IPO
Like in an IPO, crowdfunding companies are usually selling securities to "public"
investors (the "crowd") for the first time." While on first blush crowdfunding seems
to more closely resemble a private placement than an IPO,56 the opposite is true. In a
private placement, startups sell securities to well-heeled, experienced angels and VCs
who do not need or get the protections of the disclosure provisions of the securities
laws." Most notably, disclosure is not required in the common Rule 506 private place-
ment involving only accredited investors." Networks, prior interactions between
50. Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 853, 855 (2007) (describing
a Dutch auction as an IPO that "conducts price discovery via an auction," as opposed to
meetings and roadshows by underwriters); see also Langevoort, supra note 19, at 13 (in
Dutch auctions, "investors submit bids for the securities, with the price set at the sum
necessary to sell the desired number of shares").
51. Anita I. Anand, Is the Dutch IPO a Good Idea?, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 232, 234 (2006); see
also HAZEN, supra note 31, at 74 (calling the Dutch auction "relatively infrequently used").
52. Anand, supra note 51, at 233; see also Eugene Choo, Going Dutch: The Google IPO, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 414-15 (2005).
53. Choo, supra note 52, at 414-15.
54. Id. at 416 ("Although the investment banks fill orders and sell shares, they have much less
control over the price.").
55. Crowdfunding companies are unlikely to have coordinated securities sales prior to the
crowdfunding offering, while companies undertaking IPOs will have sold numerous se-
curities to investors in private placements prior to the IPO. Christine Hurt, Pricing Disin-
termediation: Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REv. 217, 239 ("Crowd-
funding via an Internet website walks a strange path between regulated public offerings
and exempt private placements; crowdfunding generally seeks to attract small amounts
of capital, as in a private placement, but in a very public offering from large numbers of
investors.").
56. Hurt, supra note 29, at 415-417 (discussing criticism of Google's Dutch auction as resulting
in far lower prices than a traditional IPO could have received).
57. See generally Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PENN. J. Bus. L. 107 (2011).
58. Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in
Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1611 (2013) ("Capital-raising
transactions under Rule 506, if directed solely at accredited investors, did not mandate
disclosure."). Cf Alan Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings, 1999
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 21 (1999) ("Though not required by the Securities Act or any explicit
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entrepreneur and investor, and narrow subject matter focus all reduce information
asymmetries and minimize the need for formal protections like mandatory disclosure
for angels and VCs.59 None of these things are true for the crowd in a Regulation CF
offering, or for the public in an IPO.
In IPOs, companies sell their shares in a coordinated matter to the public for the
first time. Because public investors have little to go on (more or less depending on the
company), the IPO process requires substantial disclosure, often for the first time, on
a Form S-1 registration statement.6 o This is securities law's primary means of reducing
information asymmetries between the company and investors.' In other words, be-
cause close networks and prior interactions between entrepreneur and investor vanish
when a company expands its sights to public investors, securities law steps in with its
most important investor-protection tool: disclosure. The massive disclosures required
in an IPO are well-known.62
Crowdfunding was explicitly designed to open formerly private investment op-
portunities to the public at large.6' To invest in a privately held startup before
exemptive condition, offering circulars for unregistered private placements generally
mimic and sometimes go beyond the disclosures mandated in a registered offering."). For
a historical look at Rule 506 and the other Regulation D private placement exemptions,
see Manning Gilbert Warren m, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption Regimen
for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REv. 355, 374-79 (1984).
59. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1405,
1431 (2008) (angel-entrepreneur connection "reduces uncertainty and information asym-
metry in the way deals are sourced and selected").
60. Jennifer O'Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 Wis. L. Rev. 217, 217 n. 4 ("The disclosure re-
quired in a registration statement is extensive."); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Due Dili-
gence Defense Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 44 Brandeis L.J. 549, 561 (2006)
("Form S-1 is a full-blown registration statement, i.e., with limited exceptions for seasoned
issuers, each required disclosure item must be set forth in the prospectus."); US IPO Guide,
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, at 3 (2019), https: / / www.1w.com / thoughtLeadership / lw-us-
ipo-guide (describing the financial disclosure process accompanying the IPO).
61. Steven L. Schwartz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future
Investors, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1044, 1068 (2005) ("The most obvious way to solve this infor-
mation asymmetry problem is for the firm issuing securities (issuer) to provide inves-
tors-both current and future-with all possible information, thereby reducing the infor-
mation asymmetry."); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 740 (2006) ("more public disclosure leads to fewer
instances of asymmetric information"); Schwarcz, supra note 43, at 10 (the function of se-
curities law is to "reduc[e] the information asymmetry between issuers of securities and
investors").
62. On-ramps and emerging growth company classifications are designed to lessen that bur-
den and entice more companies to go public. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM., Going
Public (Feb. 11, 2019), https: / / www.sec.gov / smallbusiness / goingpublic.
63. Thereby opening up new paths to capital for entrepreneurs. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Mad
Money: Rethinking Private Placements, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 2253, 2255 (2014) (observing
that President Obama commended the JOBS act "for nurturing the next Facebook or Ap-
ple by easing restrictions on ... private placements"); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 905
("crowdfunding was also designed to promote an inclusion vision of entrepreneur-
ship ... [serving] entrepreneurs of modest means, without a rich uncle, and who lack
wealthy friends.").
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Regulation CF, an investor had to be accredited (i.e., wealthy) and, as a practical mat-
ter, connected. The fear was that game-changing companies on their way up were
only available to these investors, while the general public had to wait until an IPO
(when the buy-in price is much higher and the astronomical gains are in the past).6 4 If
these investment opportunities are no longer network- or relationship-driven, how-
ever, disclosure is again needed to mitigate information asymmetries. Because crowd-
funding startups are in their earliest stages, the information asymmetries are even
greater, and disclosure is even more important. Regulation CF requires significant
disclosures for small, nascent startups." In fact, disclosure costs seem to have mini-
mized the amount Regulation CF was used in its first few years.66
Disclosure is not enough, however.6 1 In IPOs, as explained, the type of offering
and identity of the underwriter are important signals of issuer quality to public inves-
tors. Should a top investment bank like Goldman Sachs underwrite an IPO, it sends a
strong signal to potential investors who may otherwise be at an informational disad-
vantage even after reading S-1 disclosures.68 The risk-reducing mechanisms for the
crowd beyond disclosure are even more important, as startups can only disclose so
much given they are so young.6 1 Crowdfunding startups are literally just starting up,
64. Arthur McMahon, III, It Takes a Village to Fund a Start-up: How an Electronic Community for
Early-Stage Investments Can Bring Democracy Back to Equity Crowdfunding, 84 U. CIN. L. REv.
1269, 1274 (2016) ("[Olthers have praised [crowdfunding's] ability to give ordinary, mid-
dle class investors access to potentially lucrative start-up investments that have been his-
torically reserved to the wealthy or well connected.").
65. These disclosures include varying degrees of financial statements based on the amount
being offered and sold in the prior twelve-month period. 17 C.F.R. § 227.201(s). See also
Schwartz, supra note 5, at 901 (companies using Regulation CF "must provide numerous
disclosures to investors, intermediaries, and the SEC"); SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 18
("Due to the young age of the issuers, approximately half of the crowdfunding issuers
disclosed a prior year of financial statements."); id. at 24 (during the first three years of
crowdfunding campaigns under Regulation CF, "disclosure preparation [was] most ex-
pensive in dollar terms, averaging $6,218 per campaign, followed by marketing and legal
expenses").
66. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 30 ("[Mlarket participants have expressed concern about the
cost and complexity of relying on Regulation [CF, noting] the time and cost required to
comply with the [disclosure] regulations . . . .").
67. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PENN. L.
REv. 647, 651 (2014) (making the case that mandatory disclosure usually fails).
68. For a counterargument on reputational intermediary value, see Stephen J. Choi & Jill E.
Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113
YALE L.J. 269, 273 (2003) ("Intermediaries do not always function effectively .... Indeed,
the presence of high-reputation intermediaries may lull investors into a false sense of se-
curity, causing them to rely on the intermediaries and seek out less information on their
own."); See Choi, supra note 42, at 295 ("Although intermediaries can be an efficient source
of investor protections, they may also be a source of additional risks for investors. Inter-
mediaries may act unfaithfully in their screening for issuer quality.").
69. See Cable, supra note 63, at 2276 ("[Mlandatory disclosure systems tend to emphasize his-
torical facts over projections and future plans, and so provide little benefit to a company
with limited or no operating history."); Gregory D. Deschler, Wisdom of the Intermediary
Crowd: What the Proposed Rules Mean for Ambitious Crowdfunding Intermediaries, 58 ST.
Louis. L.J. 1145, 1175 (2014) (noting the challenges of early-stage issuers disclosing three
years of information if they have not reached three years); Erica Wu, Biotech Crowdfunding:.
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and thus their future is more important than their past or present.70
The original regulatory design of Regulation CF sought to employ the wisdom of
the crowd" to solve the adverse selection problem in choosing among startups. How-
ever, as I have previously argued, crowd-based wisdom is a poor fit for investing, and
a particularly poor fit for startup investing.72 Consequently, intermediation is necessary
to give crowdfunding a chance at success.73 Regulation CF, unlike the original JOBS
Act, did move toward expert intermediation by allowing funding portals to pre-screen
or "curate" the startups that list on the portal, and by allowing investment groups to
operate within the portals.74 Therefore, funding portals themselves, and the expert in-
vestors who might be enticed to dabble in crowdfunding opportunities, can guide
choices for the unsophisticated.15 Still, due to investment limit restrictions and fears of
being tagged as broker-dealers, the expert intermediation allowed by Regulation CF
may not go far enough.16 Signaling is key in crowdfunding, and we must continue to
look for even better signaling mechanisms than are currently being employed.
How the JOBS act Alone Cannot Save Investors, 18 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1061, 1092 (2018)
("Missing from the [Regulation CF] disclosure requirements ... are any details of the ac-
tual achievements and potential success of the venture."); David Mashburn, The Anti-
Crowd Pleaser: Fixing the Crowdfund Act's Hidden Risks and Inadequate Remedies, 63 EMORY
L.J. 127, 157 (2013) ("Startups face multiple disadvantages compared to more mature com-
panies due to startups' limited human, informational, and financial resources; personal
financial pressures; and greater risk and complexity in decision-making.").
70. C. Steven Bradford, Online Arbitration as a Remedy for Crowdfunding Fraud, 45 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 1165, 1168 (2018) ("[T]he companies using the [crowdfunding] exemption will be
small companies whose securities are not publicly traded, so little additional public in-
formation will be available.").
71. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 58, at 1606 ("[E]xposing an entrepreneur's idea to an
open forum allows for communication among interested parties, allowing the crowd's
collective reaction to elicit new information. . . .").
72. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 16, at 1492-93 (arguing that in
startup investing, the diversity of opinion and independence criteria for using crowd-
based solutions are not present).
73. See Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 606 (articulating the need for interme-
diaries and the risk, they curtail); see also Lin, supra note 38, at 645 ("[D]isintermediation,
[or the] complete elimination of mediums from financial transactions, is so difficult."); id.
at 643 ("Intermediation is a fundamental fact of finance."); Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without
the Crowd, supra note 16, at 1484; Langevoort, supra note 19, at 13 ("For quite a while now,
both law and economics have understood that intermediation plays an important role in
the sale of securities.").
74. On funding portals, see Schwartz, supra note 5, at 910 ("The SEC concurred that [Regula-
tion CF] would only work, or would at least work much better, if funding portals had the
power to select which companies to include, and which to exclude, from its site."); on
investment groups operating on funding portal sites, see Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without
the Crowd, supra note 16, at 1502 (giving the example of Y Combinator's investment
group).
75. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CRn. L. REv. 573, 574 (2015) ("Intermediaries
can bridge information asymmetries, enable parties to find one another, and otherwise
make it easier for parties to overcome the many barriers to transacting.").
76. SEC Report, supra note 5, at 10 (detailing how Regulation CF "provide[s] a safe harbor
from broker-dealer registration restrictions").
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IV. Underwriting Crowdfunding: The Idea
A. Why Underwrite Crowdfunding
This Section considers why crowdfunding would be a more promising option for
all parties involved if the process could mimic a firm-commitment IPO. An under-
written crowdfunding offering would offer several advantages. First, for the crowd,
an underwriter would further strengthen the role of intermediation plays in helping
unsophisticated investors avoid the extreme adverse selection problems present in se-
lecting among nascent startups.
Second, for entrepreneurs, an underwritten crowdfunding offering guarantees the
offering is successful, as the underwriter buys all the securities and also increases the
chance the startup will receive follow-on capital after the crowdfunding campaign
concludes." Crowdfunding startups of the rapid-growth variety need to attract follow-
on capital and value-added services such as advice and connections." Angels and VCs
have long offered value-added services that are critical to a growing business.79 Capital
is becoming cheaper for startups, but seasoned advice on how to deploy it remains as
important as ever."
77. Ibrahim, Crowdfunding Without the Crowd, supra note 16, at 1492-93 (discussing the signal-
ing function of angel capital); KUPOR, supra note 12, at 52 ("[Slignaling matters. Venture
firms develop a positive reputation for backing successful startup companies, and that
positive brand signaling enables those firms to continue to attract the best new entrepre-
neurs.").
78. Cf Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding, supra note 2, at 566 (startups with strong entrepreneurs
may be able to crowdfund in their earliest stages to get a discount for the lack of the
crowd's value-added services at their earliest stages).
79. D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING
Bus. L. 133, 170 n.162 (1998) (giving an example of the value-added services VCs can pro-
vide to entrepreneurs); D. Gordon Smith, Team Production in Venture Capital Investing, 24
IOWA J. CORP. L. 949, 953-54 (1999) ("[T]he Venture Capitalist also contributes so-called
'value-added services.' In a recent survey, entrepreneurs were asked to rate the im-
portance of twelve value-added services to their choice of a venture capitalist. The five
services achieving the highest ratings were the following: (1) serving as a sounding board
to entrepreneur team; (2) obtaining alternate sources of financing; (3) recruiting manage-
ment personnel; (4) interfacing with investor group; and (5) formulating business strat-
egy. These results closely track the results obtained in many other surveys of entrepre-
neurs and venture capitalists, thus suggesting a large degree of consensus regarding the
relative importance of value-added services provided by venture capitalists." (citations
omitted)); see Sam Hogg, 3 Ways VCs Can Add Value to Your Startup Beyond the Cash,
ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 9, 2014), https: / /www.entrepreneur.com/ article / 237354.
80. Anthony Mirhaydari, Private Markets Drowning in .Cheap Cash, PITcHBOOK (Oct. 6, 2017),
https: / /pitchbook.com/ news/ articles/ private-markets-drowning-in-cheap-cash ("VCs
are pushing earlier into the startup lifecycle, with buzz surrounding the raising of new
pre-seed funds that aim to step in where family, friends and individual angels tradition-
ally bootstrap embryonic enterprises."); see also KUPOR, supra note 12, at 20 (noting that
cloud computing and other changes "mean that the amount of money -you need to
raise ... to get started is much less than in the past"); id. at 274 ("If money remains abun-
dant, and value creation in startups ... remains a function of being able to build large,
self-sustaining businesses, then the firms that provide meaningful value to entrepreneurs
beyond just being a source of capital likely have an ongoing role to play.").
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Third, for underwriters, underwriting a crowdfunding offering is likely to result
in entrepreneur-underwriter collaboration on offering price, and thus a more realistic
ask from the entrepreneur."' Obviously underwriters face their own challenges, in-
cluding incentive issues. These will be discussed below.
B. Who Will Be the Underwriter?
Finding a willing underwriter may be the most challenging obstacle to imple-
menting this Essay's idea. It is fairly easy to rule out investment banks as likely can-
didates for crowdfunding underwriter for several reasons. First, an underwritten
crowdfunding offering of $50,000 would only yield a few thousand dollars on resale:
far too little for an investment bank to get involved.82 In fact, investment banks mostly
underwrite IPOs for later business from the offering company and to reward institu-
tional clients." Neither incentive is present in crowdfunding."
Two more likely candidates for underwriter emerge: the funding portal and the
angel investor." Funding portals are where crowdfunding issuers list their offerings.
Funding portals are paid a "success fee" for startups that reach their crowdfunding
goals." Should a funding portal also underwrite an offering, it would presumably
forego the success fee (since it would be paying itself) in lieu of a higher repurchase
price on resale, emulating the gross spread in a typical IPO.
8 1 Perhaps lesser-known
funding portals would offer underwriting services to attract issuers, even if it meant
registering as broker-dealers. Some funding portals such as SeedInvest are already
curating among the startups wishing to crowdfund on their websites, so presumably
they have done the diligence necessary to decide which of their listings are the most
promising.
81. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 13 ("Start-up issuers lack knowledge about such matters as
pricing and structuring deals, and about what type of information is useful to potential
investors.").
82. See Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2013),
http: / /blogs.reuters.com/ felix-salmon/ 2013 / 03 / 11 / where-banks-really-make-money-
on-ipos.
83. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
84. Most startups fail, so the risk/ reward on any particular startup becoming a lifelong client
is heavily skewed toward the risk. 339 Startup Failure Post-Mortems, CBINSIGHTS,
https: / /www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-failure-post-mortem/ (last updated Jan.
21, 2020).
85. On funding portals generally, see Joan MacLeod Heminway, The New Intermediary on the
Block: Funding Portals Under the Crowdfund Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 177, 194 (2013).
86. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 47 ("[M]ost intermediaries received a percentage fee paid in
cash and/or securities contingent on the completion of the offering."); see also Schwarcz,
supra note 43, at 7 ("Rating agencies are virtually always paid their fee by the issuer of the
securities applying for the rating ... [there would be a] collective action problem in coor-
.dinating potential investors to pay this fee.").
87. Sung C. Bae & Ham Levy, The Valuation of Firm Commitment Underwriting Contracts for
Seasoned New Equity Issues: Theory and Evidence, 19 J. FIN. MGmT. 48, 48 (1990) ("[A] gross
underwriting spread [is the difference] between the price that the issuing firm is paid for
the stock and the price at which the stock is sold to the public.").
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Other funding portals may wish to consider a change to their business model to
follow suit. During Regulation CF's first three years, the "majority of initiated and
completed offerings were conducted through the three largest funding portals,"8 per-
haps leaving lesser-used funding portals looking for a competitive angle to attract
more offerings and stay afloat."
An angel investor is another possible underwriting candidate.90 As Donald
Langevoort noted some time ago about VCs, "a venture capital firm is a repeat player
with a high degree of investment expertise that must both repeatedly attract its own
capital and prepare its portfolio companies for ultimate public distribution. Thus, it
has a reputational interest not unlike an underwriter."91 VCs, however, are more likely to
be the follow-on investors after a successful crowdfunding campaign. Angels, due to
their smaller investments at earlier stages, are potential crowdfunding underwriters.
Angels invest their personal funds in early-stage startups, at lesser amounts than VCs,
and for pecuniary and non-pecuniary reasons.92
Why would an angel underwrite a crowdfunding offering? The dollar amounts
are right for angel investment size,93 and angels who cannot underwrite a larger offer-
ing are reliant on the crowd realizing its merits and joining in the original campaign.
An underwritten crowdfunding campaign also has the advantage of giving the angel
immediate diversification of risk and cash back in hand, whereas a traditional Regula-
tion D campaign would see the angel holding all the shares indefinitely. And Regula-
tion CF can force a company to professionalize itself in ways that a private placement
might not, making the startup a more attractive candidate for follow-on financing from
VCs.94 Finally, a strategic angel could realize that a successful crowdfunding campaign
can demonstrate to follow-on investors that the startup has a motivated consumer base
88. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 27.
89. See id. ("It is possible that smaller intermediaries may exit the crowdfunding market if
they fail to attract sufficient deal flow to sustain their business model.").
90. CAPSTONE AND CAPSTONE PRESS STAFF, THE CAPSTONE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BUSINESS 13 (2003)
("Angel investors are wealthy private individuals who invest in start-up companies, usu-
ally during the early stages of financing.").
91. Langevoort, supra note 19, at 19 (emphasis added).
92. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior, supra note 59, at 1439-1440 (angels invest both to
earn a profit and to give back to the entrepreneurial community that made them success-
ful).
93. See Jeffery Sohl, The Angel Investor Market in 2017: Angels Remain Bullish for Seed and Start-
Up Investing, 16 CTR. FOR VENTURE RESEARCH 2 (noting that average angel investments are
around $388,860); see also Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior, supra note 59, at 1418
("A typical angel round ranges from $100,000 to $1 million or even $2 million .... ). As
noted earlier, the average crowdfunding target amount is currently around $50,000. See
supra note 10 and accompanying text.
94. See Darian M. lbrahim, Crowdfunding Signals, 53 GEORGIA L. REv. 197, 222 (2018) (Under
Regulation CF, "[tihe entrepreneur must put together disclosure, deal terms, and other
information in a professional format, viewable on the Internet. This may not lead to a
stronger product or service, but having to work with attorneys and accountants and de-
scribe what the company is doing can help the entrepreneur sharpen her strategy and
explain it to others. A company willing to bear these costs at an early stage signals to
investors that it is willing to 'do it right."').
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for its product or service, 95 as existing customers are likely to be the crowd that invests
in the offering."6
C. Economic Risk and Legal Liability for Crowdfunding Underwriters
Despite the potential positives for funding portals or angels to serve as under-
writer, two major concerns must be explored. First, the economics are probably not
there to incentivize a funding portal or angel to underwrite crowdfunding. A firm-
commitment underwriting of a $50,000 crowdfunding offering would only yield a po-
tential upside of a few thousand dollars, but would carry theoretically a $50,000 risk if
the underwriter could not subsequently resell. However, just like the modem firm-
commitment IPO, this risk could be ameliorated if the underwriting agreement was
not signed until subsequent purchase commitments were obtained.
97
Potential legal liability that comes with serving as underwriter must also factor
into the equation, however. Under Regulation CF's Section 4(A)(c), liability for crowd-
funding misstatements and omissions lie with the "issuer," which is broadly defined
to include "any person who offers or sells the security in such offering."" In an un-
derwritten crowdfunding offering, "issuer" would most likely capture the under-
writer as the actual seller of the security (the one who passes title).
99 Section 4(A)(c)
liability lies for an issuer's innocent misrepresentations or omissions without plaintiffs
needing to prove scienter, reliance, or loss causation.100 In fact, Section 4(A)(c) liability
explicitly resembles Section 12(a)(2) liability for public offerings.'ox
However, when it comes to the underwriter, a potentially thorny issue is whether
the Supreme Court's 10b-5 restriction limiting liability to the actual "makers" of mis-
statements or omissions also applies under Section 4(A)(c).
102  Under one
95. Id. at 220. ("[C]rowdfunding shows follow-on investors that the company has a real cus-
tomer base and that there is demand for its product or service.").
96. Id. at 219 ("Who invests in crowdfunding campaigns? For companies selling consumer
products or services, it is likely the company's customers. These customers use the com-
pany's product or service, like it, and think others will too.") (citation omitted).
97. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
98. 15 U.S.C.S. § 77d-1. A statutory offeror is a solicitor for value, and most likely includes
the funding portal hosting the offering. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1988) (artic-
ulating the statutory interpretation for section 12(1)).
99. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 643 (1988).
100. See Bradford, supra note 70, at 1183 (2018) (under 4(A)(c), the "investor does not have to
prove that the fraud caused a loss."); id. at 1184 ("Section 4(A)(c) has no scienter require-
ment."); Mashburn, supra note 69, at 152 (Section 4(A)(c) plaintiff "does not have to prove
reliance as required under Rule 10b-5").
101. Mashburn, supra note 69, at 151-57 (discussing that the liability created under 4(A)(c) is
replicated as if under Section 12(a)(2) and further noting that Section 4(A)(c) provides
liability for more than public offerings by replacing use of the sale of securities by pro-
spectus with "by any means of any written or oral communication"); see Thompson &
Langevoort, supra note 58, at 1607 (noting that imposing Section 12(a)(2)-like liability in
crowdfunding offerings is an "interesting reversal of Gustafson," a Supreme Court case
removing 12(a)(2) liability in private placements).
102. C. Steven Bradford, Shooting the Messenger: The Liability of Crowdfunding Intermediaries for
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interpretation, the answer is no: an underwriter who did not help craft the issuer's
crowdfunding disclosures would not be the "maker" of the issuer's misstatements or
omissions for 4(A)(c) liability purposes.1 0 3 But Steven Bradford sees reasons to read
the liability more broadly under Section 4(A)(c).104 Under his reading, underwriters
could be liable for a startup's misstatements or omissions unless they took reasonable
care to investigate them.'os In other words, "underwriters" would be makers of an
issuer's misstatements under this reading, but would have a Section 12(a)(2)-like due
diligence defense.'06
This potential specter of legal liability could chill a funding portal or angel's in-
centive to act as a crowdfunding underwriter.'o This is particularly true considering
that, as a practical matter, the underwriter would presumably have deeper pockets
than a startup-especially one that goes belly up due to fraud.' On the other hand,
underwriters would likely have conducted significant due diligence when deciding to
invest. Because startups also have less to disclose, perhaps the due diligence an un-
derwriter would do as a matter of course would suffice (as long as they reasonably
investigate and confirm the crowdfunding disclosures).
In addition to the explicit Section 4(A)(c) private right of action for fraudulent
crowdfunding disclosures, Rule lOb-5 liability is also available, but a more remote con-
cern for underwriters given its scienter and other requirements.'09 The SEC could also
bring action against crowdfunding issuers and underwriters for fraud.110 But due to
its limited resources and other priorities, crowdfunding may not be the SEC's top
the Fraud of Others, 83 U. CIN. L. REv. 371, 395-97 (2014).
103. Id. at 396 (issuer is used twice in 4(A)(c), and if the statute is referring to the "same 'issuer'
both times, then a crowdfunding intermediary would be liable only for false statements
it made").
104. Id. (articulating that the two reasons being that 4(A)(c) expressly creates a private right of
action, where lob-5 does not, and 4(A)(6) uses the word issuer twice, and possibly differ-
ently).
105. Joan M. Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation,
83 U. CIN. L. REv. 477, 495 (2014) ("Misstatements and omissions liability under the
CROWDFUND Act does not include Section 11's strict liability protections, but it does
incorporate a due diligence-like scheme based on Section 12(a)(2).").
106. Id.
107. See generally Dana B. Klinges, Expanding the Liability of Managing Underwriters Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 1063 (1985).
108. Professor Bradford thinks that the $1.07 million maximum offering amount under Regu-
lation CF will dissuade class action lawyers from pursuing 4(A)(c) liability. See Bradford,
supra note 70, at 1168-69. However, should an angel or VC with deep pockets stand as the
defendant, plaintiffs lawyers may take more interest.
109. lob-5 liability potentially lies for any securities transaction, although Janus Capital Group
v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), would potentially limit its applicability to
underwriters who did not prepare the startup's disclosure materials. William K. Sjostrom,
Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C.L. REv. 639, 648-49 (2009)
(Rule 10b-5 applies to "all sales of securities, whether by a public or private company").
110. Bradford, supra note 70, at 1181 ("One option is public enforcement [of Regulation CF].
The SEC can bring an action under a number of federal antifraud protections.").
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priority."' So far, there have been few enforcement actions against startups under Reg-
ulation CF."' According to the SEC's 2019 report, "a search of publicly available in-
formation in the Commission's litigation releases has not identified civil complaints or
administrative proceedings filed against Regulation Crowdfunding issuers or inter-
mediaries."113 Thus, Section 4(A)(c) is the most likely area of legal concern for crowd-
funding underwriters.
V. The Legal Changes Needed to Permit Underwritten Crowdfunding Offerings
The incentive and liability issues discussed above would need to be resolved or
else there would be no underwriters. Still, for completeness, this Essay looks ahead to
Regulation CF changes that would be needed to permit underwritings.11
4 This Part
will detail three main areas where removing certain restrictions would allow for firm-
commitment type underwritten crowdfunding offerings.
The first change is broadening who can sell in a crowdfunding offering under
Regulation CF."1 5 Currently, Regulation CF restricts use of the exemption to "issu-
ers."'16 This Essay's proposal could only be effectuated if underwriters were also al-
lowed to sell through a funding portal under the Regulation CF exemption. Second,
the $107,000-per-year investment limit for angels or other parties acting as underwrit-
ers would need to be removed for larger offerings."' Third, Regulation CF generally
puts a twelve-month resale restriction on securities purchased in a crowdfunding of-
fering."' To mimic a firm-commitment IPO, underwriters would need to be allowed
to resell securities to the crowd immediately. Each of these proposed changes will be
discussed below.
111. Id. at 1181-82 ("The SEC has limited resources for enforcement and, because of the small
amounts involved, crowdfunding is unlikely to be one of its enforcement priorities."); id.
at 1182 ("The SEC could get a bigger bang for its enforcement buck elsewhere.").
112. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 5 (noting, however, that "this inference is inherently limited
by the potential latency of misconduct as well as a relatively short period of observation").
113. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 ("One state reported two instances where the state regu-
lator alerted an issuer about potentially misleading statements or content in their offering
materials.").
114. I am not the first to suggest some revamping of Regulation CF, although the prior pro-
posals did not contemplate importing the underwriting process to this context. See Jo
Won, Jumpstart Regulation Crowdfunding: What is Wrong and How to Fix It, 22 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REv. 1393, 1405--21 (2018); see also Thomas Coke, Why the New Crowdfunding Rules
are Important but Ultimately a Letdown, 17 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 217, 218 (2017) (discussing the
"Fix Crowdfunding Act" that was pending at the time of that Article's publication).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100.
116. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a) ("Exception. An issuer may offer or sell securities in reliance on Sec-
tion 4(a)(b).") (emphasis added).
117. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 227.501 (securities sold under Regulation CF "may not be transferred by any
purchaser of such securities during the one-year period beginning when the securities
were issued").
307Spring 2020
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
A. Regulation CF Only Open to a Startup as an "Issuer"
Regulation CF only allows "issuers" to sell securities in a crowdfunding offer-
ing.n' An issuer is defined as "every person who issues or proposes to issue any secu-
rity," or anyone under the issuer's common control.120 The technical definition of an
underwriter, however, comes from Section 2(a)(11) of the 1933 Securities Act, and
states that an underwriter is "any person who has purchased from an issuer with a
view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any secu-
rity, or participates, or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking,
or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking."121 To put in simpler terms, an underwriter is someone who buys securi-
ties with the purpose of reselling them. Thus, while the common perception of under-
writers is a large investment bank such as Goldman Sachs, the definition is actually
much broader.122 Regulation CF should be specifically amended to clarify that under-
writers may use the exemption.
B. Individual Investment Limits
Regulation CF limits how much an investor can invest in crowdfunding offerings
in any given year.123 The precise limits depend on different calculations and are not
important for our purposes.124 The important takeaway is that accredited investors
119. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100. Regulation Crowdfunding added a new part to Section 4(a)(6) of the
Securities Act, which "provides an exemption from the registration requirements of Se-
curities Act Section 5 for certain crowdfunding transactions." To qualify for the exemp-
tion under Section 4(a)(6), crowdfunding transactions by an issuer (including all entities
controlled by or under common control with the issuer) must meet specified require-
ments." Crowdfunding, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428, 66430 (Nov. 5, 2013). See Laila Sabagh, The
SEC's Regulation Crowdfunding: The Issuer's Dilemma, 2. ADMIN. L. REv. ACCORD. 111, 120-
21 (2017).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(4) ("[Except that with respect to certificates of deposit, voting-trust
certificates, or collateral-trust certificates, or with respect to certificates of interest or
shares in an unincorporated investment trust not having a board of directors . .. or of the
fixed, restricted management, or unity type, the term 'issuer' means the person or persons
performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the
provisions of the trust or other agreement or instrument under which such securities are
issued....").
121. 14 C.F.R. § 230.144.
122. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 20, at 776 ("Section 2(a)(11) ... captures far more than Wall
Street investment banks as 'underwriters'.").
123. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2). See also Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 281, 305 (2014) (distinguishing accredited and unaccred-
ited investors for crowdfunding purposes).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2)(i-ii) ("The aggregate amount of securities sold to any investor
across all issuers in reliance on section 4(a)(6) of the Securities Act (15 U.S.C. 77d(a)(6))
during the 12-month period preceding the date of such transaction, including the securi-
ties sold to such investor in such transaction, shall not exceed: The greater of $ 2,200 or 5
percent of the lesser of the investor's annual income or net worth if either the investor's
annual income or net worth is less than $ 107,000; or 10 percent of the lesser of the inves-
tor's annual income or net worth, not to exceed an amount sold of $ 100,000, if both the
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cannot invest more than $107,000 in crowdfunding in a given year (unaccredited in-
vestors less).125 Accredited investors are any "natural person whose individual net
worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, exceeds $1,000,000,"1126 or "[a]ny
natural person who had an individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two
most recent years or joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in
each of those years."1 7 The angels or other parties who would serve as underwriters
would almost certainly meet this definition.
Regulatory investment accounts for individual investors are different than regu-
latory companies. They tackle risk in a different way.128 Abraham Cable has argued
that limiting risk for investors by investment size is not only good for crowdfunding,
but could also provide a model for other financial regulation.
129 In crowdfunding,
there is an "increased speculative risk in connection with whether the venture suc-
ceeds at all, as well as the increased illiquidity associated with investing in a company
not listed on a stock exchange. "13o Especially for unsophisticated members of the
crowd, an investment limit can mitigate the adverse selection effects of risky invest-
ment opportunities.
For accredited investors, however, the investment limits are more problematic.
Accredited investors get special rules in other contexts because they are either better
at selecting investments or can absorb losses better.1 3' The SEC's report on crowdfund-
ing's first three years notes that "[s]everal market participants and the 2017 and 2018
Small Business Forums recommended that the investment limits [in Regulation CF]
investor's annual income and net worth are equal to or more than $ 107,000.").
125. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM., Updated Investor Bulletin: Crowdfunding for In-
vestors (May 10, 2017), https:/ /www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib crowd-
funding-.html (hereinafter SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN).
126. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5). See also Howard Marks, What Is Equity Crowdfunding?, FORBES
(Dec. 19, 2018, 8:00 AM), https:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/howard-
marks / 2018 / 12 / 19 / what-is-equity-crowdfunding (defining accredited investors as
"those who have a net worth of more than $1 [million], excluding their home, or those
who make over $200 [thousand] annually over the past two years"). There are other types
of accredited investors beyond individuals as well. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(1-4), (7-8) (in-
cluding banks, brokers or dealers, "private business development company[ies]," "[a]ny
organization[s] described in section 501(c)(3)," directors, executive officers, or general
partners of the issuer of the securities, trusts with total assets in excess of $5,000,000, or
"any entity in which all of the equity owners are accredited investors").
127. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6).
128. See id.
129. See generally table, supra note 63 (finding redeeming qualities in the investment caps and
suggesting they might be useful in other areas of securities regulation). Importantly, this
Essay only argues for removing investment caps under Regulation CF for accredited in-
vestors or funding portals serving as crowdfunding underwriters. The caps would still
be in place for follow-on investors or non-underwritten crowdfunding offerings.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM., Report on the Review of the Definition of "Ac-
credited Investor" (Dec. 18, 2015), https: / /www.sec.gov/files/review-definition-of-ac-
credited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf; Coke, supra note 114, at 221 (discussing the investor lim-
its as one of three major flaws in Regulation CF).
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not apply to accredited investors, who face no such limits under other exemptions."132
Ultimately, the limits mean "that a large swath of capital that is theoretically accessible
is actually lopped off and will remain in other types of investments for the accredited
investor only class."'33 The report also concluded that "conducting a separate Regula-
tion D offering to allow accredited investors to invest greater amounts was unneces-
sarily confusing to investors and more costly to issuers. "134
This Essay only goes so far as to recommend that accredited investors who serve
as a crowdfunding underwriter face no investment limits. While the investment limits
would not practically matter if the average crowdfunding offering size remains
around $50,000, if crowdfunding becomes more popular or the subject of larger offer-
ings, the investment limit would need to be relaxed for underwritten offerings.
C. Resale Restriction Removal
The final change to Regulation CF involves its current resale restriction. Regula-
tion CF expressly prohibits the resale of securities purchased in a crowdfunding offer-
ing for a year.3 5 There are six exceptions to the resale restriction.136 A person can resell
the shares within a year if that person is selling the shares (1) to the company that
issued the securities; (2) to an accredited investor; (3) to a family member; (4) in con-
nection with the purchaser's death or divorce or other similar circumstance; (5) to a
trust controlled by the purchaser or a trust created for the benefit of a family mem-
ber; 1 3 or (6) as a part of an offering registered with the SEC.138
The second exception-resale to other accredited investors-is likely insufficient
to permit resales in this context, as underwriters would likely be reselling to the crowd
of unaccredited investors. Adding a seventh exception to the one-year resale re-
striction-" (7) to anyone so long as the shares are being resold by an underwriter who
purchased all of the available securities from the issuer"-would allow underwritten
crowdfunding offerings to mimic firm-commitment IPOs.139
132. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 41.
133. Coke, supra note 114, at 221-22.
134. SEC REPORT, supra note 5, at 41-42.
135. 17 C.F.R. § 227.501.
136. Id.
137. See SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 124 ("[Fiamily member is defined as a child, step-
child, grandchild, parent, stepparent, grandparent, spouse or spousal equivalent, sibling,
mother-in-law, father-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-
law, including adoptive relationships.").
138. 17 C.F.R. § 227.501; SEC INVESTOR BULLETIN, supra note 124.
139. To avoid gaming the securities laws, which are designed to prohibit an underwriter aid-
ing an issuer by purchasing and immediately reselling without being subject to the is-
suer's restrictions, the underwriter could not be an affiliate of the issuer. JAMES D. COX, ET
AL., SEcuRmEs REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 245 (8t ed. 2017) ("Those who actively
promote the sale of unregistered securities certainly are not a favored species under the
Securities Act. The sweeping definition of underwriter in Section 2(a)(11) assures this
result.").
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VI. Conclusion
Underwriting is a process that has worked well in IPOs. Underwriters serve as
valuable reputational intermediaries between companies and public investors.
Crowdfunding is an area in dire need of reputational intermediaries to signal quality
among the nascent startups seeking funding from the crowd. This Essay therefore
considers importing firm-commitment underwriting into the crowdfunding process.
If the economics could work to incentivize an underwriter to serve, including answer-
ing thorny liability questions, the advantages could make crowdfunding a more viable
path to startup financing than it is today.
